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Abstract 
 
Since the inauguration of the Nigerian federal legislature in 2007, conflicts between the Senate and the House of 
Representatives have been on the increase. But they are seen as a necessary precondition of the learning democratic process 
of the time. This paper argues that partisan conflict and bickering within the legislature can occur not only when two or more 
political parties control the two chambers but even when one party does. This is defined by the pursuit of private interests. In 
spite of the strategic importance of the legislature, adequate and relevant explanation to the conflicts within the two chambers 
seems not to have been scientifically given. Political analysts and academics rarely focus attention on scientific explanation of 
the conflicts. The article examines the theoretical insight and argues that the Nigerian state shows a unique form of 
underdevelopment, dependence, and authoritarianism.  Because of these situations, the state becomes means of production 
for those who controls it and intra-legislative relation becomes conflictive in nature.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The third wave of democratization for political reform that spread across Africa and other parts of the world in the late 
1980s and the mid-1990s culminated in the restoration of electoral pluralism in most of the countries of the continent 
including Nigeria in May 1999. This development led to the adoption of constitutional frameworks that guaranteed an 
important role in governance to the legislative arm of government. The particular form, content and scope which 
legislative power and mandate took differed from country to country. The structuring of its intra-legislative relations also 
differs. It is broadly shared that the legislature is the embodiment of the sovereignty of the people. In a democracy, the 
power of the people is exercised and expressed by the legislature. In this role, it was expected not only to make laws for 
the welfare of the generality of the populace but also to serve both as a democratically-empowered agency of restraint on 
the executive arm of government and a forum for the mobilization of popular participation in the broad governmental 
process.  Representative legislative Houses at the federal and state levels of government in Nigeria were established by 
the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria after a long period of military rule. 
          The legislature is the heart of any democratic government across the world. In most advanced democracies, the 
legislature is believed to be the closest organ of government to the people. However, this historic role played by the 
legislature has not attracted much attention, unlike the executive and the judiciary especially in the developing countries 
like Nigeria. This development according to Boyton and Kim (1975) ‘may be attributed to the nature of legislative office 
that is neither the owner of the purse or the sword’. They further argued that legislatures have been key institutions in the 
development of the west for the past two hundred years. These are very considerable when compared with our 
knowledge of legislatures in other parts of the world. There seems to be little literature on legislature as an organ of 
government, legislative behavior and legislative conflicts within the legislature itself in Nigeria. 
       Compared with the advanced Western democracies, literature on Nigerian legislature is not as rich as those of the 
western world. Many reasons accounted for this. First, most of the available historical accounts of the role of colonial 
legislatures were actual documentation of the British. Second, most writings of Nigerian scholars focused their attention 
on the development of the Nigerian state and what it offers. Less attention was paid to the documentation of the actual 
performances and conflicts therein. In spite of the strategic importance of the legislature, adequate and scientific 
explanations to the conflicts within the two chambers in Nigeria. Political analysts and academics rarely focus attention 
on scientific explanation of the conflicts between the Senate and the House of Representatives in Nigeria. 
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      The rationale for the establishment of bicameral legislature in Nigeria was based on issues of ethnic suspicion, fear of 
political and economic domination at federal and state levels and uneven access to wealth among others. Consequently, 
the National Assembly was created with the wisdom of the great compromise.  Sections of 48, 49 and 58 of the 1999 
Constitution demonstrate this compromise. The compromised arrangement that put the National Assembly in place in 
1999 envisaged an assembly with diverse interest and views which make conflict and disagreement inevitable. 
Undoubtedly, these conflicts were expected to arise in the process of legislation that concerns the welfare of Nigerians. 
This has not been so. 
          The strategic location of the legislature ensures its responsibilities for political representation of members’ 
constituencies with respect to their disparate interests, the way it is expected to perform other legislative functions, 
including law making, oversight functions on the executive to ensure responsible and accountable governance, 
reformulation of the laws on administrative action with discretion to ensure adequate enforcement of rules, and to provide 
for a national integrity system by strengthening existing institutions committed to waging war against corruption.1 The 
1999 constitution employed the principle of separation of powers as a cardinal feature for the operation of both 
constitutional democracy and presidentialism in the country. In fact, section 4 (1) of the 1999 constitution states” the 
legislative powers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be vested in a National Assembly for the federation which shall 
consist of a Senate and House of Representatives”.2  Section 4(2) also states that the National Assembly shall have 
power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Federation or any part thereof with respect to any 
matter included in the Exclusive Legislative List set out in Part 1 of the Second Schedule to this constitution. 
However, the operation of the legislature has been characterized by conflicts, confrontations, and deadlocks between the 
Senate and the House of Representatives especially between 2007 and 2011. This is because different cadres of 
political men demonstrate their involvement in politics in different methods and ways. Their modes of participation are 
likely to vary according to the socio-psychological factors which help to define them and the nature of the political system 
as well as the history of political socialization and culture that they go through. Prevalent explanations see the conflicts 
between the Houses as the unavoidable teething problems of a nascent democracy. Conflict between the Senate and the 
House are not merely the result of the learning process of the new democratic process. It is assumed that legislators will 
realize the co-ordinate characters of the Senate and the House of Representative powers and, therefore, the 
desideration of cooperative work. There are other reasons advanced that sound rhetoric favouring one chamber or the 
other and this has accumulated in both the popular press and the writings of political scientists. Much of this rhetoric 
revolves around the legitimacy of disagreement between the Senate and House of Representatives. In many publications 
by scholars, there are opinions that the platform of a party winning the majority in each chamber usually breeds 
disagreement and conflict between the two chambers. Usually, if the same party wins a majority in legislature, the gap 
between the chambers output is often held to reflect the extent of disagreement between the members. It is expected 
that conflicts will be common between the two chambers when different parties are in the majority in both chambers. In 
this case, issues are usually seen from different views and perspectives.  
Increasingly this explanation is deemed to be an optimist’s dream. Political Scientists argue that conflicts will be 
common between the two chambers when different parties are in the majority in both chambers. In this case, issues are 
usually seen from different views and perspectives and neither party is willing to abandon its position. Usually, conflicts 
and disagreements are based on policy disagreements. Conflicts based on different positions on bills and policies are 
not, therefore, new but in the Nigerian case they are not based on issues and policies. 
The 1999, 2003, and 2007 general elections made the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) pivotal in the National 
Assembly. The National Assembly is not divided by electoral results. Nigerians expected that acting upon their 
strengthened bargaining position in the National Assembly, that rancorous and conflictive relationships could be reduced 
to its barest minimum. It was assumed that a party with a majority in the two chambers of the legislature and controls the 
executive will then be able to carry out its platforms. This has not been the case.  
However, in a country such as Nigeria where economic development is at the lowest level, the motivating factor 
has always been private interest, personal ego and sectional interest as the driving force of politics and of the feuds 
between the two chambers. Within two years of the present civilian administration, two Senate Presidents have been 
impeached, one Speaker of the House of Representatives have been disgraced out of office, his successor has come 
close to impeachment at least twice and there have been financial scandals/probes in both the Senate and the House of 
Representatives. Many legislators see the proverbial “hand of Esau and voice of Jacob” in these events. Consequently, 
many allegations have been made. Accusing fingers have been pointed at the former President Obasanjo for bribing 
some legislators to destabilize the National Assembly. 
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An examination of intra-legislative conflict between the two chambers between 1999 and 2009 reveals that despite the 
Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) controlling the majority seats in the two legislative bodies, the overall level of conflicts 
has been on the increase. Recent examples include the reception programmes planned for the President of Finland, 
Tarja Kaarina Halonen,who was to visit the National Assembly as part of her engagements in Nigeria, the passage of 
2008 Appropriation and the bickering between the two chambers over which of them will host the joint sitting for the 2010 
budget.  
This paper, therefore, aims to critically evaluate how the pursuit of private interest and massaging of personal ego 
of members of the two chambers reinforce the conflictive and rancorous relationships within the National Assembly. This 
strand of analysis is central in framing our problematique of the conflict between the two chambers. In reality, intra-
legislative conflicts are not as a result of a different party controlling the two legislative arms, learning process and on the 
issue of principle and dedication to good legislation by standing on both sides of public interest, but, however, reflect a 
great deal of pursuit of private and selfish interests. Secondly using primary data collected through structured 
questionnaire, semi-structured interview and relevant documents (such as newspapers, magazines, etc), the paper tends 
to answer the question—Does the intra-legislative conflictive relations between the Senate and the House of 
Representatives be traced to pursuit of private interests and massaging of personal ego? 
 
2. The National Assembly in the Fourth Republic 
 
Since the return to democratic governance in Nigeria in 1999, intra-legislative relations at the federal level have 
witnessed three phases: 
1. The radical phase (1999-2003) 
2. The conservative phase (2003-2007) 
3. The ego-centric phase (2007-date) 
The first phase witnessed immense internal unity which helped it to ward off executive interferences in the running of 
their affairs. They were vibrant and radical right thinking members who understand their mission there. Although 
executive-legislative relations were conflictive in nature and character, relations between the Senate and House of 
Representatives were cordial. In this phase, the federal legislature was saddled with the task of maintaining internal 
cohesion and stability in warding off the presidential interference in the election and appointment of principal officers of 
the assembly and being a check on the excesses of the executive. During this phase, two Senate Presidents were 
impeached; one Speaker of House of Representative was also disgraced out of office. The first Senate President, Evan 
Enwerem was removed from office because he was alleged to be President Obasanjo’s stooge, sponsored and planted 
by him. The Speaker of the House of Representatives was removed based on certificate racketeering and was equally 
accused of being sponsored by the President. 
          The second phase is what we called conservative phase or what we may call ‘rubber stamp’ legislature, in which 
the President because of his previous experience with the National Assembly carefully ensured that the majority of the 
radical members were not reelected into the federal legislature. The fraudulent elections of 2003 made that mission 
possible for the President. It was constituted by members of “Say Yea, the Eyes  have it” or what may be called “yes 
members” except of course the tenure elongation saga which they overwhelmingly rejected due to serious internal and 
international pressure. This phase lacked the vibrancy of the first phase as it ceased to be a check or watch dog on the 
excesses of the executive. 
          The third phase has the majority of the second phase as members of the federal legislature as well as few new 
members. Ever since its inception in 2007, its goals have been to pursue parochial private interests of members of each 
chamber. From 2007 to date, internal conflicts and rancorous relations become the decisive factor in the federal 
legislature. Essentially, their focus has moved from a watchdog role to self-aggrandizers who seek nothing but private 
interest perpetuated by the quest for money and wealth. 
 
3. A Methodological Note 
 
This study was designed to employ multiple data gathering strategies, both primary and secondary. First, it is based on 
desk review involving examination of important literature on the subject. Secondly, a comprehensive questionnaire and 
interview section was designed to enable respondents of both federal and state legislators to freely express their 
opinions on the intra-legislative conflicts in Nigeria. A sample size of 400 respondents was projected for the study to be 
drawn from federal and state legislators, lawyers and members of civil society organizations. Only 210 were returned and 
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used for our analysis for measuring the relationship between private interest and intra-legislative conflict in Nigeria. We 
did this to test our hypothesis based on the claim that the pursuit of private interest and personal ego increases conflicts 
between the Senate and the House of Representatives. The selection of these respondents was purposive. In terms of 
distribution, the six geo-political zones were used, Port Harcourt, Enugu, Lagos, Kaduna, Markurdi, Yola and Abuja. 
These reflect state capitals in the geo-political zones of the country.  Finally, purposive samples of respondents 
concerning the objectives were taken. 
Responses from the questionnaire were coded and analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS). Descriptive analysis--- frequencies cross tabulations and chi-square results were generated with SPSS for the 
study.  
 
3.1 Theorizing Intra-Legislative Conflicts in Nigeria 
 
One basic concept of modern democracy is derived from the theory of separation of powers as propounded by Baron 
Montesquieu. This theory has been assumed to be the cornerstone principle of democracy in the last three centuries. In 
1748, Montesquieu published the Spirit of Laws (Esprit de Lois) in which he reformulated an ancient idea in political 
theory. In Book XI of the Spirit of Laws, Montesquieu ascribed liberty in England to the separation of legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers, and to the balancing of these powers against each other.3 In medieval European 
constitution making, the idea of division of powers came to be a counterforce against the divine sovereign powers 
claimed by monarchs. And in England, the long struggle between the crown and both parliaments and courts of common 
law, which climaxed in the Glorious Revolution of 1688, underscored the importance of separation of powers and checks 
and balances. 
The genius of Montesquieu lay in reformulating an idea connoting a political balancing of economic and social 
interests into a system of legal checks and balances between parts of a constitution. Montesquieu conceptualizes a 
system of government in which each traditional arm of government (i.e. executive, legislative, and judiciary) maintains 
clear and distinguished functions of its own as allotted to it by the constitution with checks and balances from the other 
two arms. American federalists later adopted the propositions of Montesquieu especially Madison, as the organizing 
framework of the American constitution. The constant aim is to divide and arrange the branches of government in such a 
way that each may be a check on the other to check tyranny and conflict between the arms of government. Although the 
idea to separate and co-ordinate the power of the three arms of government has been a major principle of liberal 
democratic constitution making for many years, political scientists, often neglect its organic connection to competitive 
capitalism. Consequently, there is no attempt to theorize its general and fundamental basis especially the relations 
between the two chambers of the legislature. 
Therefore, a fundamental understanding of separation of powers especially within the legislature and the changes 
it has undergone in specific countries lies in the character of capitalistic production and the capitalist state. Being a 
market oriented commodity driven system, the capitalist society invariably evolves a legislative force seemingly standing 
above society and appearing as the guarantor of the collective interests of the people. In the West, separation of powers 
was particularly important at the phase of competitive capitalism for it served to balance conflicting interests of fractions 
of the ruling class, for instance, the estates in medieval Europe. Because these interests were usually inscribed in the 
arms of government, the liberal state which corresponds to competitive capitalism, appears as non-arbitrary, impartial 
and therefore capable of guaranteeing both the interests of the dominant and dominated classes and factions.  
From the preceding analysis, two critical points have to be made about intra-legislative conflicts from competitive 
capitalism and the liberal state. First, the political function of the state, which consists of exercise of legitimate violence 
and the reproduction/inculcation of the dominant ideology, takes precedence over its economic function. Indeed, the 
liberal states rarely intervened directly in the market. Second, the legislature, which symbolizes popular power, tends to 
be dominant over the executive and administration. This dominance arose because parliament as the sanctuary of law 
and legislative power incarnated general norms whose universal and formal character constituted the essential features 
of modern law. However, the legislature has become a declining and fragmented body trying with little success to cope 
with the expansive and over dangerous power of a stronger institution, the executive. 
The Nigerian state as well as its ruling class which emerged at the phase of monopoly capitalism, as a periphery 
variant of it, has also been shaped by it, and this class focused attention exclusively at the level of superstructure and 
were nowhere controlling the system of production on which politics has been anchored as in the advanced capitalist 
states. What followed was that the class resorted to the use of state power to secure their economic base and built an 
economic empire for itself. The state, therefore, becomes an instrument for the achievement of personal interests. Since 
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every member of the National Assembly uses the state power for that purpose, conflicts become inevitable and the intra-
legislative conflict in Nigeria can be located in this context. Because the state power has assumed a major means for 
capital accumulation, the ruling class while pursuing its  private economic interests so often do clash with one another, 
the implication being multiplication of conflicts in the process of pursuing these private interests with total disregard to the 
public/national interests. The state tends to be all-powerful. Since this state is all-powerful and there are few safeguards 
on how its tremendous power is to be used in a moderate and civil manner, groups and individuals such as the members 
of the legislature take a great deal in controlling it. In the circumstance, competition among these various groups of 
people to control its power is cut-throat in nature and there is unprecedented primacy of politics since to be excluded 
from this power is utter ruin and to be included is lasting prosperity.   
 
Fig. I: A Theory of Private Interest and Legislative Conflicts 
 
                
 
4. The Role of Private Interest and Personal Ego in Federal Intra-Legislative Conflict in Nigeria 
 
Since the return of democracy in Nigeria in 1999, four legislative Assemblies have been elected at both the national and 
sub-national levels: these were in 1999-2003, 2003-2007, 2007-2011 and 2011-2015 respectively. The members of the 
National Assembly were elected to make laws for the smooth running of the country including legislating for peace, order 
and good governance of the federation. 
 However, the leadership of the National Assembly often demonstrates propensity for conflicts between the two 
legislative chambers. This is because the role of the state in Nigeria is becoming increasingly obvious as a means for the 
achievement of private interest and personal ego. The condition of the country’s underdevelopment means that political 
or state power offers opportunities for public officeholders to rise above the general poverty and squalor that pervades 
the entire Nigerian society. Perhaps, political power has served the private interest of the members of the National 
Assembly and has been used to foster private interest for the benefits of their families, friends and praise singers. State 
power is probably the easiest means for which one enriches oneself for whoever has acquired it.  
 Besides, the state has become a means of production for those who have acquired it and have control over its 
resources. State power becomes parceled out and personal interests become deflected as collective interest. This 
primacy of politics becomes even worse as economic resources reduce or become more concentrated in few hands, 
usually as result of neo-liberal economic policies at home, and a global economy in which the periphery is profoundly 
disadvantaged. As this happens, the social base of the peripheral capitalist state becomes even narrower, further 
intensifying the primacy of politics and disrespect for moderating rules. The state remains a state of private and sectional 
interests rather than a representative of the collective interests of the people. The state exists as prebends parceled out 
to various private and sectional interests. Consequently, politics becomes fiercely prebendal as private and sectional 
interests engage themselves in fatal contest for increasing and defending their share of the powers of the state and the 
enormous economic advantages therefrom.4 In fact the Nigerian state presents the following characteristics namely: 
absolutism, arbitrariness, absence of moderating rules, low legitimacy and lack of unity of powers.  This process has 
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dominated the present conflict between the Senate and House of Representatives. The relations between the two 
legislative bodies are therefore, essentially relations of conflict based on competitive materialistic interest and personal 
ego. 
In understanding what private interest denotes, it is important to begin with the understanding of the meaning of 
public interest or national interest. This will help us in conceptualizing private interest. Simply put public interest refers to 
the common well-being or general welfare. It covers the whole range of subjects from sovereignty, unity and security of 
state to communal amity, economic stability, and the standard of decency and morality. In a nutshell, public interest 
involves sovereignty, welfare, unity, faith, peace, and progress. This is central to policy debates, politics, democracy and 
the nature of government itself. In other words, public interests include factors such as ensuring the efficient and effective 
running of public services and an interest in ensuring the administration of justice.  In this sense the public is a group of 
non-specific persons (Nigerians outside the government). They are persons that share an interest as they consider 
themselves as potential members of a non-specific group, abstracting from their particular position and private interest. 
This is related to Rousseau’s concept of the General Will. Thus the contrasting view of public interest is private interest. 
What is not public interest is private interest and private interest is motivated by a narrow and parochial concept of self 
interest: wealth, fame and power. If there is conflict between the public and private interest amongst government 
decision-makers, the public interest suffers. A country where public interest is dominant, both leaders and the citizenry 
work towards achieving the public interest which is their common objective. But when leaders pursue private interest, 
resources earmarked for public interest are diverted to private use. The pursuit of private interest by the members of the 
National Assembly makes intra-legislative conflict inevitable, and this is why corruption is endemic in Nigeria.  
What follows this is personal ego which has become the moving force for the actions of the members of the House 
of Representatives and the Senate. The word, ego is taken directly from Latin where it is the normative of the first person 
singular personal pronoun and is translated as “I myself” to express emphasis. Ego in philosophical terms means one’s 
self. It is used to mean a sense of self. It is an inflated feeling of pride in superior to others5  and this feeling has taken 
control and crossed the line into arrogance, obnoxiousness and overactive need to be recognized and to be in charge in 
the business of the two houses in the process of law making in Nigeria. The ego becomes the driving force for the 
members of two chambers for primitive accumulation which is devoid of morality while satisfying their material quest.  
To be sure, a Nigerian Senator earns more than the American President, Barrack Obama. The president of the United 
States earns an annual salary of $400,000 (N64.156m), including a $50,000 expense allowance making the president the 
highest paid public servant in the US. The $400,000 includes everything and $350,000 out of which is taxable.6  In the 
same manner, while the minimum wage is $1,257 (N191, 667), a US lawmaker earns $15,080 (N2.3m) per month. In the 
United Kingdom, a lawmaker earns $8,686 (N1.3m) monthly while the gross national minimum wage is $1883 (N283, 
333) per month.7  In 2011, Nigerian Senate President earns N560m ($3.7m) per annum. The Speaker of House of 
Representatives earns N225m ($1.51m) per annum, while national minimum wage in Nigeria is N7, 500. Other Senators 
earn N225m ($1.5m) per annum excluding other monthly allowances such as housing, vehicle maintenance, 
entertainment, utility, wardrobe, personal assistance, domestic staff, recess allowance and newspaper allowance for 
members of the two chambers. 
 
Additional Monthly Allowance for National Assembly Members 
 
                                                            Senate           Reps 
Housing Allowance                             N4.96m          N3.96m 
Vehicle Maintenance                           N1.86m          N1.485m 
Entertainment                                      N0.74m          N0.594m 
Utility                                                  N0.74m          N0.594m 
Wardrobe                                             N0.62 m           N0.494m 
Personal Assistance                             N0.62m             N1.485m 
Domestic Staff                                    N1.86m              N1.485m 
Recess Allowance                                N0.25m             N0.198m 
Newspapers                                           N0.37m            N0.297m 
Total                                                       N12.02m          N9.603m 
Source: BusinessDay, 21 June, 2010:1          
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In 2011 each member of the Senate earned N2.48m every month while his counterpart in the House of Representatives 
earned N1.98m per month. In the same year the lawmakers sought to increase their allowances by hundred percent. 
Consequently, a Nigerian Senator now takes the following as salary and allowances: 
 
• Basic Salary: (BS)                N2, 484,245.50 
• Hardship Allowance:       50% of basic salary N1, 242,122.75 
• Constituency Allowance: 200% of BS N4, 968,509.00 
• Furniture Allowance:   300% of BS N7, 452,736.50 
• Newspaper Allowance: 50% of BS N1, 242,122.75 
• Wardrobe Allowance: 25% N621, 061.37 
• Recess Allowance: 10% N248, 424.55 
• Accommodation: 200% N4, 968,509.00 
• Utilities: 30% N828, 081.83 
• Domestic Staff: 35% N863, 184.12 
• Entertainment: 30% N828, 081.83 
• Personal Assistance: 25% N621, 061.37 
• Vehicle Maintenance Allowance: 75% N1, 863,184.12 
• Leave Allowance: 10% N248, 424.55 
• Severance Gratuity: 300% N7, 452,736.50 
• Motor Vehicle Allowance: 400% N9, 936,982.00 
• Total per month       N29, 479,749.00 by 109 Senators.8  
 
The National Assembly has been by the foregoing an Assembly for looting. There is serious doubt whether these have 
been slashed by 20% as requested by the late President, Umaru Yar’Adua. 
Comparatively, the US Senate Leader earns $193,400 per annum as salary. His counterpart in the House of 
Representatives earns $208,100 as salaries and allowances. In the UK, the Leader of Lords earns $136.031 per annum 
and the Speaker of House of Commons earns $136.031 per annum. Currently, the Senate President in Nigeria earns 
N250m quarterly or N83.33m per month.9 Senate Deputy President gets N150m per quarter or N50m a month.  What this 
means is that a federal legislator in Nigeria is paid more than double what a member of British legislator  earns at least 8 
times as much as an  American legislator earns per annum and more than 3 times the American President.  This jumbo 
pay has not been translated into quality legislations that touch the lives of Nigerians positively. Rather the conflicts 
between the two branches of the legislature have led to the decline of passage of bills especially under the period in 
review.  
 
Table 1: National Assembly and Bills Passed 
 
Has the conflictive relations between the Senate and House of Representatives led to a decline in 
the number of legislations passed?      
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid no  response 2 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Yes 190 90.5 90.5 91.4 
No 18 8.6 8.6 100.0 
Total 210 100.0 100.0  
Source: Data from fieldwork 
 
From Table one above, it is the general opinion of our respondents that such conflicts between the two chambers do not 
encourage passage of bills for the benefit of many Nigerians.  In fact, coming against the backdrop of reports that only16 
bills were passed, including the statutory yearly budget since June 2007 when the sixth session was inaugurated the 
view that the National Assembly has not lived up to the expectation of Nigerians is pervading.10 Out of 210 respondents, 
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190 representing 90.5% was of the view that conflicts between the two chambers led to the decline in the passage of 
bills. Only 11 of the bills have received presidential assent. 
Table 2 below shows that pursuit of private interest is rife and pervasive among members of the National legislature.  
 
Table 2: Conflict between the Senate and the House 
 
Do you think that the conflict between the Senate and House of Representatives on the chairmanship of Joint Committee 
on the review of the 1999 constitution is predicted on? 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid no response 5 2.4 2.4 2.4 
national interest 5 2.4 2.4 4.8 
private interest 189 90.0 90.0 94.8 
public interest 4 1.9 1.9 96.7 
party interest 5 2.4 2.4 99.0 
ego problem. 1 .5 .5 99.5 
supremacy/power tussle. 1 .5 .5 100.0 
Total 210 100.0 100.0  
Source: Data from fieldwork 
 
Out of 210 respondents 189 representing 90% was of the opinion that the conflict between the two houses is predicated 
on the pursuit of private interests. A country where private interest is dominant, both the leaders and the citizens rarely 
work towards achieving the national interest which supposed to be their common goal. For national interest to be 
achieved, the leaders have to play vital roles, especially being selfless, since they are the ones that enact laws with 
which the country is governed. In this kind of country, where leaders pursue private interest, nothing works since their 
concern is what they can grab from the system. This encourages endemic corruption and ineptitude since money 
budgeted for development will be diverted to private bank accounts. 
           Currently, the global capitalism is cumulatively making the situation worse. It has done this by creating two 
competing legislative chambers. They view their positions from purely private, sectional and partisan considerations. The 
dominant philosophy of the members of the National Assembly is oriented towards acquiring, grabbling and accumulating 
wealth thereby creating antagonistic relationship between each other. Thus, government in Nigeria, whatever their 
outward forms, is merely a reflection of underlying economic forces, primarily the pattern of ownership of the “Nigerian 
State”. The constitution of 1999 for both theoretical and practical reasons anticipates a legislature that largely shared 
powers but sometimes exclusive. However, the calculation of the House members is that the Senate is playing a game of 
economic exclusion, hence the face-off between the two Houses. The bribery scandals rocking the National Assembly 
bear testimony to this fact of over-bearing private interests as the driving force of the feuds between them. The 
legislature which is supposed to be embodiment of universal reason and collective will of the people-nation is 
increasingly becoming an assembly of corruption. 
        Currently, Nigeria Senate President earns 560million Naira ($3.7m) per annum. The Speaker of House of 
Representatives earns 225million Naira ($1.5) per annum as salary. However, the US Senate Leader earns$193,400 per 
annum as salary. His counterpart in the House of Representatives earns$208,100 per annum as salaries and 
allowances. In the UK, the leader of the House of Lords earns $136.031 per annum and the Speaker of the House of 
Commons earns $136.031 per annum. In Nigeria, other members of the Senate earns 225millions ($1.5m) each per 
annum. In US Senators earn $174,000 each per annum, and in the UK each Member of the Parliament earns$94.558 per 
annum. Currently in Nigeria, each member of the Senate earns 2.48million Naira every month and the members of the 
House of Representatives earn 1.98million every month. Recently the Law Makers have sought to increase their 
allowances and salaries by 100 percent. This explains why the rancorous relationship between the two chambers has 
been enormous. Recently, the Governor of Central Bank of Nigeria, Mallam Lamido Sanusi stated that 25% of the federal 
spending was being consumed by the National Assembly.11 The federal government overhead for 2010 was 536.2billion 
naira while National Assembly overhead was 136,259,768,102 which are exactly 25.41% of the federal government. The 
following evidence bears testimony to the claims that the intra-legislative conflicts in Nigeria are based on personal 
interest and massaging of personal ego by members of the two chambers.  
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4.1 The walk-out from Minna Retreat 
 
The current feud between the Senate and the House of Representatives stems from the above analysis. The walk-out of 
the House of Representative members from the retreat of the Joint Committee on Constitutions Review in protest against 
the Deputy Speaker of being designated as Deputy Chairman, and not as co-chairman of the committee suggests that 
personal overrides national interest. The walk-out suggests that it is beyond co-piloting the affairs of the committee on 
review of the 1999 constitution. Otherwise, it is hard to believe that the House of Representatives can trivialize a matter 
of great national importance and deep concern to the country. It is difficult to see how proceedings at a meeting can be 
effectively directed by two persons as co-chairman with equal powers of control. There just cannot be two captains in one 
ship. The impression created by the wrangling over a matter that should not be the subject of controversy warranting a 
walk-out is that the House members of the Joint Committee are more interested in the perquisites of a co-chairman – 
allowance, jeeps, luxury hotel suite and such other privilege befitting the dignity of a co-chairman of the committee – than 
in delivering to the Nigerians a reformed constitution better suited to their needs for good governance.12  Because of the 
difficulty mentioned above, the progress and success of a constitution review exercise is more likely to be impeded than 
facilitated if meetings of the committee are presided over by two persons as co-chairman. 
 
Table3: Which Chamber should be blamed for Generating Conflicts? 
 
  
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid no response 23 11.0 11.0 11.0 
Senate 17 8.1 8.1 19.0 
House of Representatives 169 80.5 80.5 99.5 
4 1 .5 .5 100.0 
Total 210 100.0 100.0  
Source: Data from fieldwork 
 
The general consensus is that the House of Representative should be blamed for generating conflict and strained 
relationships between the Senate and itself unnecessarily. 169 respondents representing 80.5% was of the opinion that 
the House should be blamed. The argument the House advanced in scuttling the inauguration in the co-chairmanship of 
the committee was neither constitutional nor canvassed and approved as part of the programmes of the constitution 
review committee. The unwarranted competition and struggle for personal allowance and other economic interests 
hinders the legislature from legislating for people’s welfare. This is a clear case of greed, selfishness, and indifference to 
the yawning and expectations of Nigerians who had hoped so much on the National Assembly and the executive arm to 
turn around the Nigeria economy. Rather, they are enmeshed in the battle of ego and personal interest. 
The issue of co-chairmanship, therefore, appears odd because there is always, in a meeting or and associations, a 
chairman. Furthermore, the assistant is known by different names; deputy chairman, vice chairman and alternate 
chairman. The meaning of deputy, vice or alternate is that when that chairman is absent, one of these other three names 
act as chairman unless he is absent from the meeting. And section 53(2) of the 1999 Nigerian constitution clearly defines 
the spheres of power and position of the joint legislative committee and of personality disputes among the leaders of the 
National Assembly.  Ego problems associated with acquisitive instincts explain the fact that there is no substance in the 
issue of who is chairman of the Joint Constitution Review Committee. 
The reason why the House of Representatives want to ensure that the title “co-chairman” is employed is to make 
sure that the chairman takes no decision without consulting the co-chairman. However, the chairman never takes any 
decisions. The committee does. This is because in parliamentary meetings, there is no situation where one person takes 
a decision. Issues in the National Assembly are decided by vote, not by chairman. As chairman of a Joint Constitutional 
Programmes, the chairman is a presiding officer. He sits down and arranges who talks next and puts the issue to vote. It 
is therefore an aberration to talk of co-chairman by the House of Representatives because decisions in the legislative 
houses are taken by a majority. Well, it seems that the members of the House see the position of a chairman as an 
executive position, but it is not an executive position. They are presiding positions to bring order into the decision-making 
process.13 Therefore, the concept of co-chairman is alien to legislative vocabulary and the issue under contention should 
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not have arisen in the first place. The issue of co-chairman does not exist in the parliamentary dictionary, not even in the 
English lexicon. 
 
4.2 The Bickering Between the two Chambers of the National Assembly over which of them will host the joint sitting for 
the 2010 budget presentation  
 
The conflict between the two chambers of the National Assembly in November, 2009, again seems to be infantile and 
diversionary. This time it was over which of them will host the joint sitting for the president’s budget presentation for 2010. 
The Senate argues that a joint session of both chambers to receive the presidential address on annual budgets is 
unconstitutional. 
 The Senate wanted the presentation to be done in its chamber while the House of Representatives argues that the 
tradition of budget presentation by the President is usually done in the chambers of House of Representatives. This has 
always been the convention to receive the budget in the House of Representatives. It is larger and the Senate President 
presides. Usually after the presentation of the budget by the President, the speaker gives a vote of thanks. This seems to 
be the tradition with countries operating bicameralism.  
 The mundane supremacy fight between the Senate and the House of Representatives does not show that the 
legislators appreciate their role, which is to make laws for the betterment of the country. Nigerian Federal lawmakers are 
perhaps the best paid in the world, yet they are turning out to be the least productive. The presentation was postponed 
owning to this face-off between the two chambers over the choice of venue to receive the president. 
 The Senate wanted the budget to be presented in the Red chamber of the Senate chamber, but this was opposed 
by the House of Representatives. The House insisted that it would not attend the session as parliamentary convention 
since 1999 to date dictated that the budget is presented to lawmakers in the House of Representatives, which has a 
larger chamber because it has 360 members. There are only 109 senators. The Senate’s argument is that the venue is 
not stipulated anywhere in the 1999 constitution. I think there is noting constitutional about the venue of a joint session. It 
is not contained in any of the study rules, neither is it in the constitution. The idea of presenting the budget in a joint 
session is not even in the constitution. 
 What is in the constitution in sections 81(1) is that the President shall cause to be laid before the two chambers of 
the National Assembly a copy of the estimate of the appropriative bill for the following year. The Senate argues that there 
is no prescription in the constitution for a joint sitting. Section 53 of the 1999 constitution specifies who the chairman is 
when there is a joint sitting between the two chambers and the chairman has the prerogative to decide who performs 
what functions when that situation arises. It is not for anybody to dictate who gives vote of thanks. That is a normal 
procedural issue in the course of a joint session. 
 Since the inauguration of the sixth National Assembly over two years ago, the frosty relationship that has existed 
between the two chambers and their leaders has imparted most negatively on the quality of the enacted laws. It has 
stymied both the constitution review process and the Electoral Act amendment.  
 
4.3 Presentation of 2010 Budget to the National Assembly by President Yar’Adua 
 
Section 81(1) of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria simply states that: 
  
The President shall cause to be prepared and laid before each House of the National Assembly, anytime, in each 
financial year, estimates of the revenue and expenditure of the federation of next financial year.14  
In compliance with this provision of the constitution, the President had on November 3, 2009, written to the National 
Assembly craving their indulgence to grant him “the slot of 11.00 am on November 19 to formally address the joint 
session of the National Assembly on Budget 2010”.15  The idea behind the early presentation of the Appropriation Bill is 
for the lawmakers who hold the approval power to expenditure to have enough time to go through the process of 
appropriation so that the executive arm of government can also execute the budget early enough in the following year. 
 Since 2007, the Senate and House of Representatives have only agreed on money bills, specifically Appropriation 
Bills. The House has 28 bills awaiting concurrence with the Senate while the Senate has 12 bills waiting for its 
concurrence. The reasons for approving appropriation bills are obvious and important. To be sure, it tends to support the 
personal and group pursuit of the legislators. For example in the 2010 appropriation bill the National Assembly plans to 
spend for themselves N1.1 billion on meals and refreshments.17 They also planned to spend N15.1 billion on honorarium 
and sitting allowances. In 2009 appropriation budget, the National Assembly was allocated N59.8 million for refreshment 
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and meals. To clear rats and mosquitoes from the House of Representatives section of the National Assembly complex 
N100 million was voted. We can now see why before 2007 and since 2007 the Senate and House of Representatives 
have agreed on money bills, especially Appropriation Bills. This current scenario paints a picture that even the 
appropriation bills will soon be affected. 
 Personal desire of members of the House of Representatives has blindfolded them so that they desire to be 
placed on the same rung with Senators on the legislative leader. But they do not appreciate the fact that their colleagues 
in the Senate are ranked higher even on the protocol order. As the constitution places the Senate President as the 
chairman of any joint sitting so does it move him or the Senate President as chairman of the National Assembly. The 
Senate President is the chairman of National Assembly and in any joint sitting of the National Assembly where the 
Senate President is physically present, he presides. This is an age-long norm and conventions that have come to be 
accepted globally. Where the budget is presented is no way fundamental to the operations of the legislature. It is not 
even a constitutional matter. 
 Because of personal interest and ego, little issues of no importance are trivialized to make it important. President 
Yar’Adua then had to present 2010 budget by proxy, in separate sessions of the two Houses; thus aborting a 10-year-old 
tradition and convention of the presidential presentation of the budget to a joint session of the National Assembly. It was 
in the midst of this instability and bickering that the executive initial N4.1 trillion proposition was padded by yet another 
N529 billion by the National Assembly which in the normal political process and going by the doctrine of separation of 
powers, ought to be limited to lawmaking.17  By this, Executive appropriates, while the National Assembly legislates.  
 However, over the years especially from 1999, the legislature has brazenly introduced concepts such as 
constituency projects, legislative offices and other amorphous terms to inject projects and consolidate their interests in 
the various appropriations with intent to muscle the executive into ceding part of its powers to it.  It was based on the 
foregoing that the Acting President initially objected to the signing of 2010 budget before reversing himself.  
 In the 2010 the National Assembly was allocated a total of N127.7 billion out of which the House of 
Representatives will spend more than 22 billion on local and international travels. Senators on the other hand will spend 
about N6 billion for the same purpose.18  The legislators however added another hefty allocation captured under the sub-
head; “Programmed Activities”. Under this sub-head, the Senate got an allocation of N9 billion while the House or 
Representatives was allocated the sum of N3.2 billion.19  
 
Table 4:   The Conflict between the Senate and House of Representatives on the Joint Sitting for Presentation of 
2010 Budget was based on? 
 
 
 
 
The conflict between the senate and House 
of Representatives on the Joint sitting for 
presentation of 2010 Budget was based on? 
no 
response
Personal 
ego Arrogance
Constitutional 
ambiguity 
Lack of understanding 
of their constitutional 
role 
6 6 1 12 13 
132 17 6 7 10 
Total  138 23 7 19 23 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 67.604a 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 60.585 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 61.373 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 210
a. 4 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.27. 
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In this case, the above analysis output of the proposition that the conflict between the Senate and House of 
Representatives on the Joint sitting for presentation of 2010 Budget was based on either of the following, personal ego; 
arrogance; constitutional ambiguity; and lack of understanding of their constitutional role; clearly show that the 
significance value is so low that it is displayed as .000, which means that it would appear that the two variables (that is 
the question and the responses) are, indeed, related. The significance value (two-sided Asymptotic Significance) has the 
information we are looking for in the sense that the lower the significance value, the less likely it is that the two variables 
are independent (unrelated).  
 
4.4 The Passage of 2008 Appropriation Bill 
 
Another area of conflict between the Senate and the House of Representatives was the passage of the 2008 
Appropriation Bill as submitted by the President in 2007. The National Assembly had pledged a commitment at its 
inauguration in 2007, to make sure National budgets were always passed on time to make for easier implementation by 
the executive. It was a commitment that the Senate and the House of Representatives as well as the executive pledged 
and made it a contract. They recognized the damage delays in the passage of appropriation bills had caused 
governments in the past, the poor public image it has heated for the National Assembly and the absence of dividends of 
good governance that Nigerians were denied of. Since the inception of the sixth session in 2007, only 16 bills have been 
passed by the National Assembly. These included yearly budgets. Only 11 of the bills have received Presidential assent. 
After the presentation of 2008 budget proposals by President Umaru Yar’Adua in September 11, 2007, the Speaker of 
House of Representatives pledged the House commitment to a speedy passage of the budget, declaring that it was only 
under such circumstance that governance could be meaningful to the people. The Senate on its part equally expressed 
such sentiments when on November 18, 2007 the Senate said it would not relent on working for the earliest passage of 
the budget. This commitment was to ensure that the appropriation bill becomes operational by January, 2008. 
Incidentally, days into the 2008 financial year, the budget was yet to be passed. It seems that the two legislative 
chambers have appeared to have forgotten all they pledge, relegating all that concerned the budget to the background, 
as they quarreled over matters of constitution review. Each house blamed the other for delaying the passage of the 
budget. The Senate on its part had come out in unmistakable terms to accuse the House of Representatives of Scuttling 
the early passage of the budget. They blamed the House for staling development and progress of the country. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The underdevelopment of Nigeria and the conflictive relationship between the Senate and the House of Representatives 
are anchored on the problem of private interest and self-serving leaders who are in public institutions to satisfy their 
private aggrandizement and self glorification. Essentially, Nigerian politicians seek public offices only for personal interest 
rather than improved services to the Nigerian nation. That the legislators’ actions have affected and paralyzed 
government activities cannot be over emphasized. It has in particular jeopardized actions on the most pressing 
assignment of the Joint Committee on Constitution Review as a result of power tussle among the presiding officers of the 
National Assembly. 
The current face-off over who is superior between the two chambers of the National Assembly, the Senate and 
House of Representatives, is a misplacement of priority by those elected to represent and serve the people of Nigeria. 
The squabble over obvious trivial matters explains the nature and characters of the member of the National Assembly in 
particular and the governing class in general. Their engagement is absurd, sublime and ridiculous squabble shows they 
have nothing to offer the nation. This has questioned the legislator’s sense of responsibility and patriotism because of 
legal and moral arguments being espoused by both the Senate and the House. 
Democratic government, are made by people. Their forms are influenced greatly by impersonal economic, social, 
cultural and political factors. For democracy to succeed in Nigeria, people operating organs of government must create 
enduring institutions and norms, adopt procedure and institute policies that will command the support of the citizens. One 
digressing influence is the fact that the members of the Nigerian ruling class do not control the productive forces of 
society and as such are not productive. The Nigerian state and its governing class lack an economic base for effective 
governance. They are parasite and depend on the state power for private capital accumulation. And because they are 
parasitic in nature, there is very serious struggle and competition for the control of the state power and those who have 
acquired it now use it for personal goals. 
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The struggle and competition for the acquisition of the state power and private capital accumulation translates to the 
struggle and conflictive relationships between the Senate and the House of Representatives in Nigeria. This is because 
state power has remained attractive since it solely provides quick economic rewards for those who have acquired state 
power. Thus, transformative legislature is gradually eluding Nigerian legislative House. To be sure, they have become 
unable to act as independent initiators of policies and to reconcile as well as channel societal demands and conflicts. It 
has equally made socio-economic and political reformation anchored on justice, equity and accountability impossible. 
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